## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CRIMINAL NO. 07-785 (JLL)

GEOFFRY KOUEVI

**ORDER** 

Defendant.

LINARES, District Judge.

Defendant Geoffry Kouevi having moved to suppress statements made to ICE agents; and the Court having held a suppression hearing; and the Court having considered the briefs presented as well as the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence; and for the reasons set forth on the record, attached hereto as Exhibit A; and for good cause shown;

IT IS on this 21st day of July, 2009,

ORDERED that Kouevi's motion to suppress (Docket Entry No. 65) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jose L. Linares
United States District Judge

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## EXHIBIT A

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                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                       FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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                          Criminal No. 07-785(JLL)
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        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                                TRANSCRIPT OF
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                                                PROCEEDINGS
                 -vs-
                                                   OPINION
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        GEOFFRY KOUEVI, a/k/a KANGNI,
                                                July 21, 2009
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                 Defendant.
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                                                Newark, New Jersey
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        BEFORE:
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                       THE HONORABLE JOSE L. LINARES,
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                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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            Pursuant to Section 753 Title 28 United States Code, the
        following transcript is certified to be an accurate record
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        as taken stenographically in the above-entitled proceedings.
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        s/Phyllis T. Lewis, CSR, CRR
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                      PHYLLIS T. LEWIS, C.S.R., C.R.R.
           Official Court Reporter - United States District Court
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                 P.O. Box 25588, Newark, New Jersey 07101
                             (732) 735-4522
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THE COURT: This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion to suppress the statement of Geoffrey Kouevi, the defendant in this case.

There were several documents that were marked into evidence during the suppression hearing that took place on Monday, July 20th, 2009. Those items were as follows:

First, there was a U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement Statement of Rights form signed by the

defendant, as well as Agent Joseph Salavarria, who testified

in this matter. That was marked into evidence as

Government's Exhibit JDS-3. The Court notes that it has

examined this document. Next to the question that reads:

"Do you understand your rights? (Initials)," the defendant

placed his initials.

Also next to the line: "Do you wish to waive your right? (Initials)," again the defendant placed his initials and signed below it.

The form additionally indicates that the rights were read to the defendant, and that the defendant acknowledged that he understood same.

The Statement of Rights submitted as Government's Exhibit JDS-3 coincides with the testimony of Agent Salavarria in the way that the issue of the Statement of Rights was addressed with the defendant.

Also marked into evidence were the handwritten

notes of Agent Salavarria, which were marked into evidence as Government's Exhibit JDS-2, as well as his typewritten report, which was placed into evidence as Government's Exhibit JDS-1. The Court has also read both of those documents.

I have also been given documentary evidence in this case, two pieces of paper marked Exhibits HG-6 and HG-7.

Both of those have to do with Payless ShoeSource,

defendant's employer.

The other witness that testified on behalf of the Government was Marlon Betances, who is an employee and supervisor at Payless ShoeSource.

The document marked as Exhibit HG-6 is an RSP Booklet, Payless ShoeSource questionnaire, containing a number of questions, specifically 142 questions, which the defendant was asked to complete. The supervisor testified that employees are required to answer these questions all of which are in English, and the defendant has acknowledged that he had to complete this questionnaire.

There is also a Payless ShoeSource document marked as Government's Exhibit HG-7, which sets forth the dates that the defendant underwent different types of training throughout his employment.

Marked in evidence by the defense as the last piece of documentary evidence was Supplemental Hearing Defendant's

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Exhibit No. 1. That exhibit is the "Consular Notification and Access Instructions for Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials." Basically that document includes a summary of the requirements pertaining to foreign nationals, steps that are to be followed when a foreign national is arrested or detained, and the detailed instructions on the treatment of foreign nationals. It also contains the information about who is responsible for notification of arrests and detentions. It contains the statements that are to be read to foreign nationals, including translations of those statements, and it contains in the back of it copies of the articles that defendant claims that are applicable here, including Article 36, which deals with Communication and Contact with Nationals of the Sending State. Among the things that are indicated by the Article is that "Consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communications with and access to the consular officers of the sending State."

Also, "if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State, if a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner." In any

event, the Court has reviewed that document as well.

Furthermore, the Court has taken into consideration the arguments by counsel, the briefs that were submitted in anticipation for the motion for suppression of Mr. Kouevi's statement and the testimony of the witnesses that testified.

It is clear that the main issue in this case is whether the evidence that was produced establishes by a preponderance of the evidence to this Court that Mr. Kouevi was sufficiently proficient in English, such that he understood the rights that were given to him and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights, instead electing to communicate with law enforcement officials.

In conducting that analysis, the Court acknowledges that it should take into account many different factors. As an initial matter, however, the defense attorney has acknowledged that this is not a situation where he is challenging the voluntariness of the statement by the defendant. The real crux of the defense objection to the statement is that they view the statement as not being a knowing waiver of a right that was understood by the defendant.

In determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, I do consider the fact that the defendant may have had some language difficulties that could have affected his custodial interrogation. But having

said that, the evidence in this case does indicate that although the defendant may have had some language difficulties, they were not of the type that affected his ability to fill out questionnaires in English in the past relating to job activities, driver's license, or driver's license-related questions, or to participate in job interviews and complete surveys.

Although the defendant makes an argument that it would have been preferable to have given him his rights or have read him his rights or explained his rights in his preferred language, which in this case is French, the fact that all of the above was communicated in English does not automatically translate into a constitutional violation. Here, the record indicates that the defendant was in the position to understand those rights when they were read to him in English and when he read them himself and responded to the inquiries by the agent in English.

The key here is whether the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the agent in communicating with the defendant did so in a way that was understood by the defendant, and whether or not the defendant then voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made a decision to go ahead and communicate with the agent in question.

As a general matter, the Court does take into

consideration the fact that the consular notification procedure was not followed in this case. That fact, however, is not fatal to the admission of the statement.

As the Supreme Court held in <u>Sanchez-Llamas v.</u>

Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) suppression is not the only means of vindicating Vienna Convention rights.

Id. at 350, 2682. Rather, "a defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the volunariness of his statements to the police." <u>Id.</u> Here, defendant does not lodge a challenge to the voluntariness of his statements, and therefore his Vienna Convention argument is inapplicable. Importantly, however, even if the Vienna Convention right were considered by this Court, it would not lead to suppression.

The issue is whether or not he understood the rights that he had, which under our Constitution appear to be even broader than any rights generated by the Vienna Convention. In fact, the agent who testified said that he explained to him he didn't have to speak at all, that these were his rights, and nobody could take them away from him.

So the first issue for the Court to consider is, based on the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence that was presented, whether or not the agent in fact gave the defendant or advised the defendant of his rights. I find that the Government has proved by the preponderance of

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the evidence that the defendant was advised of his rights. He was advised of his rights by way of a form, which the defendant appeared to have read, initialed and signed. The form and the manner in which it was signed and initialed is consistent with the testimony of Agent Salavarria in the manner in which he said he explained the rights to the defendant, and that he also read the form to the defendant, and then had the defendant initial and sign it. I find by preponderance of the evidence that that in fact occurred.

Having found that the defendant was advised of his rights, the issue then becomes whether the Government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant understood those rights and thereafter waived them voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.

The Government makes a good point that a lot of the information that was obtained from the defendant, which the defendant acknowledged under cross-examination to have been accurate, could only have come by way of a discourse between two people who understood the conversation that they were having. Details about the distances of where a house was located, the location of where somebody lived, the relationship between parties, the monetary situation of an individual, and many of the other different factors are only facts that could have been elucidated from the defendant if the defendant was understanding the questions that were

being asked of him and providing information in response.

This buttresses the Government's position in this case that the defendant clearly understood the instructions he was receiving that day, knew that he had the ability to not give a statement, if he didn't want to, or ask for a lawyer and chose to waive that right. This is also buttressed by the testimony of the employer who came and testified with regard to the defendant's proficiency in English and ability to understand and follow instructions, and it is finally supported by the documentary evidence.

For all of those reasons, taking into consideration the fact that the defendant is a foreign national with some amount of language difficulty and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant was in a custodial interrogation situation, and taking into consideration all of those factors and the manner in which the interrogation was done, the documentary evidence that was presented and all of the factors that I indicated earlier, I find that the motion for the defendant in this case to suppress the statement is denied as the prosecution has met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence as required by law.

Therefore, I will sign an order to this effect and the statement will come in.

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